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TREATMENT OF TREAS. REG. §1.752-6 PROVIDES
INSIGHT INTO THE APPLICATION OF REVISED
I.R.C. §7805(b)

By:
Vincent R. Barrella*
Walter Antognini**

In Maguire Partners-Master Investments, LLC v.
1
United States, a District court in California joined the Seventh
Circuit in Cemco Investors, LLC v. Unites States, 2 in upholding
the validity of Treas. Reg. § 1.752-6 and the retroactive
application of that same regulation. This same regulation was
declared invalid by the Court of Federal Claims in Stobie Creek
Investments, LLC v. United States 3 and the District court for
Colorado in Sa/a v. United States. 4 In addition, in Klamath
Strategic Investment Fund, LLC v. United States 5 a District
court in Texas called into question the retroactive effect of the
regulation.
These opinions are important because they are the first
cases to address the restrictive provisions regarding
retroactivity of regulations applicable to statutes enacted after
July 30, 1996. Prior to its amendment, section 7805(b)
provided that regulations were effective retroactively unless the
*J.D., LL.M (Tax), Associate Professor of Taxation, Pace University
**J.D., LL.M (Tax), Associate Professor of Taxation, Pace Un iversity
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Secretary of the Treasury (hereafter "Secretary") provided
otherwise. 6 Section 7805(b) 7 now provides that regulations are
to have prospective effect unless they fit within certain
specifically delineated exceptions.
I. CLASSIFICATION OF TREASURY REGULATIONS
AND DEFERENCE ACCORDED TO EACH CLASS

Treasury regulations fit within three broad
classifications - legislative, interpretative or procedural. 8
Legislati ve regulations are those issued by the Secretary where
Congress "has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill." 9 In
these instances, Congress can be viewed as having vested in
the Secretary the right to "make the law" in a specific area. 10
Interpretative regulations are those promulgated by the
Secretary under the general grant of authority contained in
section 7805(a). Their scope is more circumscribed as the
authority conferred upon the Secretary by section 7805 is to
interpret a particular statutory provi sion.
In Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc, the Supreme Court stated that "legislative
regulations are given controlling weight unless they are
arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute." 11
The deference accorded properly adopted legislative
regulations is, therefore, virtually absolute. In evaluating a
legislative regulation the threshold issue is whether, "Congress
has directly spoken to the precise question at issue . . . [if it
12
has], that is the end of the matter."
If "Congress has not
directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does
not impose its own construction on the statute ... [r ]ather if the
statute is silent or ambiguous ... the question for the court is
whether the agency's answer is based upon a permissible
construction of the statute." 13
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The deference accorded an interpretative regulation is
not as clear. The threshold question is again whether Congress
has directly addressed the issue the regulation seeks to address
in a clear and unambiguous manner. If that is the case, there is
14
no room for administrative intcrpretation.
Where Congress
has not addressed an issue, or has done so in an ambiguous
fashion, the reasonable interpretation of the administrator of an
agency (e.g., the Secretary) should be adhered to even if the
reviewing court would have not adopted the same approach. 15
Stated another way, a court must defer to the administrator's
judgment so long as the administrator' s interpretation is one of
a number of possible reasonable interpretations.
16

the Supreme Court
In United States v. Mead,
considered whether a tariff classification ruling issued by the
United States Customs Service was entitled to the deference
accorded regulations under Chevron. The ruling at issue in
Mead was analogous to an Internal Revenue Service (hereafter
" Service) letter ruling. 17 The Supreme Court refused to accord
the classification ruling in Mead the same deference accorded
18
Mead's significance lies in the
regulations under Chevron.
fact that it affirmed the standard of judicial review applicable
to interpretative regulations set forth in Chevron. 19

Chevron did not specifically address interpretive
regulations promulgated by the Secretary under section
7805(a). Two earlier Supreme Court cases that did so were
National Muffler Dealers Association, Inc. v. United Statei 0
and Vogel Fertilizer Company v. United States. 21 Neither of
these cases was the subject of analysis in Chevron, thus leaving
open the question of whether they or Chevron set forth the
appropriate level of deference to be accorded interpretative
regulations issued pursuant to the general grant of authority
conferred upon the Secretary under section 7805(a).
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In holding the regulations at issue in National Mujjler
valid, the Supreme Court stated that "[i]n determining whether
a particular regulation carries out the congressional mandate in
a proper manner, we look to see whether the regulation
harmonizes with the plain language of the statute, its origin,
and its purpose."22 Applying that same standard in Vogel
Fertilizer, the Supreme Court struck down Treas. Reg.
§1.1563-l(a)(3) as incompatible with the statute. 23 The court
held in the context of interpretative regulations that the
"general principle of deference, while fundamental, only sets
'the framework for judicial analysis; it does not displace it. "'24
The majority held that Congress had directly addressed the
question that was the subject ofTreas. Reg. §I.l563-l(a)(3) in
a clear and unambiguous manner, after analyzing the language
and the legislative history of the statute. Thus, the regulation
was found to be invalid. This conclusion left no room for the
Secretary to interpret the statute and is fully consistent with
rule articulated in Chevron. 25
The Tax Court has continued to apply National Muffler
in testing the validity of interpretative regulations. In its view,
Chevron merely represents a restatement of the standard
articulated in National Mujjler. 26 In Swallows Holding, Ltd. v.
Commissioner/ 7 the Third Circuit rejected this view. It held
28
instead that Chevron effectively preempted National Mujjler.
In many cases the same result would obtain regardless of which
test is applied. The Chevron standard is, however, a more
liberal one which affords a greater degree of deference to
interpretative regulations promulgated under section 7805.
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II. THE RETROACTIVITY OF TREASURY
REGULATIONS UNDER SECTION 7805
The retroactive exceptions fall within two categories,
those which are temporal and those which are substantive.
Under Section 7805(b )( 1), a regulation cannot be applied
retroactively to any period prior to the filing of final , temporary
or proposed regulation with the Federal Register or
alternatively the date on which any notice substantially
The principal
describing their contents is published. 29
substantive exceptions are found in section 7805(b)(3) relating
to the prevention of abuse and section 7805(b)( 6) relating to a
legislative grant allowing for an effective date earlier than that
prescribed in section 7805(b)( 1).
The threshold question in evaluating the Secretary's
authority to invoke the substantive exceptions permitting
retroactivity under section 7805(b)(3) is the extent to which
prior case law under Old Section 7805 should be imported into
the analysis. 30
Under Old Section 7805(b), the Secretary's decision not
to apply a regulation prospectively, was subject to review
under an abuse of discretion standard. 31 Judicial review was
generally predicated on the need to prevent fundamental
unfairness in situations where the Secretary sought to alter
settled tax policy upon which a taxpayer justifiably had a right
to rely. 32
33

In Anderson, Clayton & Company v. United States,
the Fifth Circuit set forth some of the relevant factors for
determining whether to accord a regulation retroactive effect.
These included:
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(1) whether or to what extent the taxpayer
justifiably relied on settled prior law or policy
and whether or to what extent the putatively
retroactive regulation alters that law; (2) the
extent, if any, to which the prior law or policy
has been implicitly approved by Congress, as by
Legislative reenactment of the pertinent Code
provisions; (3) whether retroactivity would
advance or frustrate the interest in equality of
treatment among similarly situated taxpayers;
and (4) whether according retroactive effect
would produce an inordinately harsh result. 34
In Snap-Drape, Inc. v. Commissioner, 35 the Fifth
Circuit reaffirmed that "this list of relevant considerations is
neither exhaustive nor exclusive" and that it " merely reflects a
distillation of prior case law." 36 The court held that the factors
listed in Anderson, Clayton were intended only to serve as a
guide and that the presence of all four " factors" was not
required in order for a court to conclude that the retroactive
application of a regulation does or does not constitute an abuse
of discretion. 37 The court in Snap-Drape held the regulations
before it valid despite finding that "the retroactive application
of this regulation has already produced inordinately harsh
results. " 38 It did so because it found that the Secretary satisfied
the requirement that the regulation served a rational legislative
purpose. 39
Under Old Section 7805(b), where there are existing
regulations, or a clearly established administrative practice, the
Secretary is generally precluded from issuing new regulations
40
having retroactive effect. That limitation, however, is not
absolute as the Secretary has the authority to correct erroneous
regulations or administrative practices. For example, in Dixon
v United States,41 the Supreme Court stated that the Secretary
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"could make retroactive a new regulation increasing tax
liability beyond that provided for by the prior regulation where
the superseding regulation corrected an erroneous
interpretation of the statute." Moreover, taxpayers relying on
non-authoritative administrative pronouncements generally do
. pen·142
so at the1r
.
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to whether Congress has indicated a willingness to permit
retroactivity, and whether the retroactive application of a
particular regulation serves a rational legislative purpose.
III. TREAS. REG. § 1.752-6

(A) Its Origins and Purpose
Where there is no outstanding regulation construing or
interpreting a statute when the Secretary chose to issue
regulations, those regulations could apply with retroactive
effect since the taxpayer's liability was governed by the
underlying statute. 43
This rule is applicable even if the
44
regulation is promulgated after litigation has comrnenced,
although the regulation would remain subject to review under
45
the abuse of discretion standard.
It is arguable that by eliminating the blanket authority
granted the Secretary to allow regulations to have retroactive
effect under Old Section 7805(b), Congress obviated the need
for a court to apply the traditional standards for determining
whether the Secretary abused his discretion. For statutory
provisions enacted after July 30, 1996, the sole inquiry in
determining retroactivity of regulations should be compliance
with the literal language of either section 7805(b)(3) or
7805(b)(6).

Thus, where the Secretary relies on section 7805(b)(3)
(relating to the prevention of abuse), the inquiry should be into
the potential existence of the type of abuse the retroactive
application of a particular regulation is intended to combat.
Upon a finding that the potential for such abuse exists, the sole
inquiry should be whether the regulation represents a rational
or reasonable attempt to prevent that abuse. Similarly, where
the reliance is on section 7805(b)(6) (relating to a
Congressional grant of authority), the inquiry should be limited

Section 358(h)(l) was added to the Internal Revenue
Code by section 309(a) of the Community Renewal Tax Relief
Act of 2000 (hereafter "CRTRA").46 It generally requires that a
shareholder, who receives stock in an exchange, or series of
exchanges, must reduce the basis of that stock to its fair market
value by subtracting any liability the corporation assumes.
Section 358(h)(2) provides exceptions to this rule
where ( 1) a trade or business is contributed to the corporation
or (2) " substantially all of the assets to which the liability is
associated" are transferred to the corporation. The Secretary is,
however, permitted to set forth circumstances under which the
aforementioned exceptions do not apply.
Section 358(h)(3) provides that "the term ' liability'
shall include any fixed or contingent obligation to make
payment."
CRTRA §309(c) provides, in pertinent part, that:
The Secretary ... shall prescribe rules . .. under
subchapter K . . . to prevent the acceleration or
duplication of losses through the assumption of
(or transfer of assets subject to) liabilities
described in section 358(h)(3) ... in transactions
.
Ivmg
. partnersh.1ps .. ..47
mvo
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The Secretary relied on this language in promulgating Treas.
Reg. § 1. 752-6. The Service's position is this provision
provided it with the authority to prescribe regulations that
requires a partner to reduce the basis of his partnership interest
by the amount of any liabilities described in section 358(h)(3)
that the partnership assumed (or, alternatively took property
subject to) in exchange for an interest in the partnership. Those
critical of the regulations have ascribed a narrower meaning to
the statutory language. They argue that the authority granted to
the Secretary was limited to prescribing regulations which give
effect to section 358(h) only in cases where a partner or
partnership is the transferor shareholder in an exchange
48
involving a corporation.

(B) Is Treas. Reg. § I. 752-6 Legislative or
Interpretive in Nature?
The threshold question regarding Treas. Reg. § 1.752-6
is whether it is a legislative regulation or an interpretive one.
There can be no question the statute explicitly grants the
Secretary the authority to issue regulations which give effect to
the provisions of section 309(c) of the CRTRA. As such it is a
legislative regulation entitled to Chevron deference.49 Thus,
the key question is whether Congress in the statute has directly
spoken with respect to the issue in a clear and unambiguous
fashion, or whether the statute is silent or ambiguous. If it is
the latter, the validity of the regulation can not reasonably be
questioned. Stated another way, Treas. Reg. § 1.752-6 is
invalid only if Congress has unambiguously and directly
addressed the issue the regulation purports to address, or the
regulation is "arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to
the statute."5 Finally, if Treas. Reg. § 1.752-6 is valid, its
retroactive application is guaranteed by reason of section
7805(b )(6).

°
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Those courts which have declared Treas. Reg. § 1. 752-6
not to be legislative in nature have relied on a number of
overlapping arguments. 51 These are: ( I) that section 309(c) of
the CRTRA makes no mention of section 752 (Klamath, Stobie
Creek), (2) that since section 309 was first proposed on
October 19, 1999, before the issuance of Notice 2000-44,52
Congress could not have been aware of the partnership
transactions covered by that Notice (Klamath), (3) that the
regulation is not a "comparable" rule because it does not
address the acceleration or duplication of losses (Sa/a, Stobie
Creek), (4) that Treas. Reg. § 1.358-7 represents the only valid
exercise of the authority granted to the Secretary (Klamath),
and (5) that the regulation does not purport to address liabilities
described in section 358(h)(3) (Sa/a).
With respect to the absence of any specific reference
to section 752 in the statutory language or legislative history of
CRTRA §309(c), Klamath and Stobie Creek either ignore or
give no we ight to the fact that the statute specifically refers to
Subchapter K, of which section 752 is part. Moreover, the
determination of a partner's basis is not governed by section
752, but rather by section 705, although partnership liabilities
play an important role in determining a partner's basis under
that section.
As to the second point, that because of its timing
Congress could not have been aware of the type of transactions
covered by Notice 2000-44, this is essentially a statement that
in the absence of a direct reference to section 752,
Congressional knowledge of "overstated basis" transactions
cannot be inferred. This argument has superficial appeal,
however, it should be noted that Notice 2000-44 had already
been issued when the CR TRA was passed by the House and
Senate on December 15,2000. 53
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While both Sa/a and Stobie Creek addressed the issue
of "comparable" rules and the "duplication or acceleration of
losses," they did so in a different manner. Sa/a addressed each
of these points separately, while in Stobie Creek the court
viewed them as part of the same argument.
The court in Sa/a acknowledged that the obligation
under the contributed short option position would constitute a
contingent liability within the meaning of section 358(h)(3). It
held, however, that Treas. Reg. § 1. 752-6 did not provide rules
"comparable" to those contained in section 358(h), because it
failed to adopt the exception set forth in section 358(h)(2)(B). 54
Assuming that section 358(h)(2) is relevant in determining
"comparability," Sa/a simply ignores the "[e]xcept as provided
by the Secretary" language of that section which allows the
Secretary to determine when the section 358(h)(2) exceptions
55
Thus, the Secretary appears to have been
shall not apply.
well within his rights to provide the "exception to the
exception" that the Sa/a court found objectionable. 56 It would
appear that the court in Sa/a erred by requiring that Treas. Reg.
§I .752-6 achieve a result identical to that which it believes
would have resulted from the application of section 358(h) to a
transaction within the purview of section 351.
The more cogent argument, advanced by both the court
in Sa/a and Stobie Creek, is that Treas. Reg. § 1. 752-6 does not
address the "acceleration or duplication of losses." Sa/a held
that Notice 2000-44, and consequently Treas. Reg. § 1. 752-6,
instead addressed transactions that "result in a single loss that
occurs at a specific time: liquidation of the inflated-basis
57
The court in Stobie Creek articulated this same
assets."
argument stating that "[t]he mandate of Congress ... in Section
309(c) ... was not to combat inflation of basis ... [but] to
preclude the acceleration and/or duplication of losses."58
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According to the court in Stobie Creek Treas. Reg.
§ 1. 752-6 cannot be a "comparable" regulation "when it does
not speak to transactions involving the possible acceleration
59
and/or duplication of losses." (Emphasis Added).
What
appears to have been lost on both courts is the fact that the
inflated basis that section 358(h) addresses does not result in a
60
prohibited accelerati.on or duplication of a loss; rather, it is
the disposition of the stock received in a section 351 transfer
that caused a loss to be accelerated and/or duplicated.
Similarly, something more needed to occur in order for a loss
to be accelerated in the transactions before the court in Sa/a
and Stobie Creek. Consequently, section 358(h) and Treas.
Reg. § 1. 7 52-6 both similarly focus on the "possible"
acceleration of a loss because of the existence of an inflated
basis. 61 The question is - Whether the recognition of a "real"
loss resulting from the disposition of stock having an inflated
basis, should be denied; while the recognition of a "created"
loss resulting from the disposition of an asset having an
inflated basis by reason of it having been passed through a
partnership, should be respected?
In Klamath, the court held that Treas. Reg. § 1.358-7
was "plainly the type [of regulation] contemplated by [section
309(c) of the CRTRA]," because it addressed "rules applicable
to partnerships that were shareholders in corporations that
engaged in transactions subject to Section 358(h)." The court
thus restricted the ability of the Secretary to issue regulations
under the grant of authority contained in CRTRA §309(c) to
those situations where partners or partnerships became
shareholders of a corporation in a transaction w ithin the scope
of section 351. The Klamath court did not cite any authority
either within section 309 or its legislative history in support of
its position.
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There can be no question that Treas. Reg. § 1.358-7
addresses the situation described by the court in Klamath, nor
can it reasonably be asserted that this action was not within the
grant of authority conveyed to the Secretary by Congress.
However, the possibility of an acceleration or duplication of a
loss where a partnership or partner was a transferor in a section
351 transaction is limited in scope. 62 Arguably, the Secretary
could have crafted regulations to address these limited
circumstances under his authority to issue interpretive
regulations pursuant to section 7805(a). 63 The fact that the
Secretary was able to issue Treas. Reg. § 1.358-7 under the
specific grant of authority contained in CRTRA §309(c), does
not mandate a finding that this is the only situation the
Secretary was authorized to address. Had section 309(c) been
drafted in the conjunctive (i.e., "and") that would certainly
have favored a finding that the Secretary's authority was
limited to situations in which a partner or partnership
participates in a transaction within the scope of section 351 .
Congress, however, drafted section 309(c) in the disjunctive
(i.e., "or").
The court in Sa/a held Treas. Reg. § 1.752-6 to be
overly broad, because it sought to extend section 358(h)(3)
outside of the corporate realm. In reaching this conclusion, the
court analyzed the language of section 358, but it failed to
analyze the language of CRTRA §309(c). The court could
have more carefully examined the meaning and interaction of
two specific phrases, the first being the "liabilities described in
section 358(h)(3)" and the second being "in transactions
involving partnerships."64
Focusing on its limiting language, "[f]or purposes of
this subsection," the court concluded that the section 358(h)(3)
definition of " liability" was limited in scope to corporate
exchanges, such as those described in section 351 . Having
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reached this conclusion it then went onto to hold that since
section 358(h)(3) applies only to corporate exchanges, the
phrase "in transactions involving partnerships" was a reference
to corporate exchanges to which partnership was a party (i.e.,
the type of transaction covered by Treas. Reg. § 1.358-7). This
construction is not unreasonable, but it is not the only possible
interpretation of the language of section 309(c).
65

Section 358(h)(3) is definitional in nature,
thus,
CRTRA §309(c) can be read as follows, "The Secretary .. .
shall prescribe rules ... under Subchapter K .. . to prevent the
acceleration or duplication of losses through the assumption ...
of [any fixed or contingent obligation to make payment] in
transactions involving partnerships." When construed in this
manner, the phrase "in transactions involving partnerships"
does not carry with it a requirement that the participating
partnership be a party to a corporate exchange.
This
construction is consistent with the rules embodied in Treas.
Reg. §1.752-6.
Like the court in Klamath, the Sa/a court bottomed its
holding on the fact that Congress did not specifically amend
section 752 to incorporate the contingent liability language of
section 358(h)(3), nor did it specifically reference section 752
in CRTRA §309(c). However, neither did Congress clearly
indicate an intention to limit the scope of section 309(c) to only
those situations described in Treas. Reg. § 1.358-7. Under
Chevron had Congress done either, that would have ended the
matter.
Chevron mandates that when Congress does not
unambiguously and directly address the precise question at
issue, the Secretary may issue regulations filling the gap. Once
the Secretary has done so, a court may not construe the statute
to its own liking, to the exclusion of another permissible
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construction. Rather, the Secretary's interpretation will control
unless it is " arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the
statute."
In Stobie Creek, Sa/a and Klamath, each court
determined that the intent of Congress was clear and
unambiguous that the grant of authority to issue regulations
pursuant to CRTRA §309(c) extended only to those
transactions that involved the acceleration or duplication of
losses where a partnership or partner was a party to a corporate
exchange, such as, the transferor of property to a controlled
corporation pursuant to section 35 J. Having so held, the
decision not to treat Treas. Reg. § 1.752-6 as a valid exercise of
the Secretary's authority is consistent with Chevron.
As noted above, it is an open question as to whether
CRTRA §309(c) provides direct unambiguous direction on this
issue. In that case all three courts would have erred, because in
effect they would have preferred their construction of the
statute over that of the Secretary, an approach specifically
rejected in Chevron.

(C) lfTreas. Reg. § 1. 752-6Is Interpretive In Nature,
Does It Represent a Valid Exercise of the Secretary's
Authority Under Section 7805?
There can be no doubt that the Secretary had the
authority to make a prospective change in the regulations under
section 752 to force a reduction of basis for contingent
66
liabilities.
The only requirement is that the regulation
represents a reasonable interpretation of the underlying statute.
If the interpretation is a reasonable one, a court may not
substitute its judgment for that of the Secretary. 67 The focus,
therefore, is on the Secretary's efforts to make the regulation
retroactive.
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Section 7805(b)(3) can only apply if the regulation was
issued to "prevent abuse." There can be no question that Treas.
Reg. § 1. 752-6 satisfies this requirement. The type of
transactions at issue in the cases that have addressed the
validity of these regulations are clearly abusive in nature .68 In
order for a regulation to have retroactive effect under section
7805(b)(3) the regulation must interpret or construe a post July
30, 1996 statute.
The problem is not one of timing, but rather what part
of the CRTRA would the regulations purport to interpret. If
the regulation was issued pursuant to the lawful exercise of the
authority granted the Secretary under section 309(c) of the
CRTRA, then it would be a legislative regulation and by virtue
of section 309( d) would be retroactive to October 18, 1999. 69
If, however, as determined by the courts in Klamath,
Sa/a and Stobie Creek, the regulation was not legislative in
nature then the Service could not rely on section 309(c) as the
predicate statute. Under Chevron, the opinions of those courts
can only stand if section 309(c) represented a clear and
unequivocal expression of Congressional intent that only
transactions of a type described in Treas. Reg. § 1.358-7 were
intended to be within its scope. Ifthat is the case, it is difficult
to envision how Treas. Reg. § 1.752-6 could be found to
"harmonize with the plain language of the statute, its origin,
and its purpose." 70 It would also be unlikely that the regulation
could satisfy even the more liberal standard of Chevron - that
it simply be a reasonable interpretation of the statute.
Thus, if Treas. Reg. § I. 752-6 is interpretative in nature,
the only way it can have retroactive effect is to satisfy the
requirements of Old Section 7805(b). Under that provision, all
regulations are retroactive unless the Secretary provides
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otherwise. The Secretary could have, for example, allowed the
regulation to be valid back to the date of the enactment of
section 752, or he could have, as he did, picked a later point in
time. 71 Had Congress not enacted CRTRA §309(c), it is likely
that the Secretary would have made the regulations retroactive
to the date of the release of Notice 2000-44. Regardless of the
earlier date chosen, the Internal Revenue Service would need to
establish that the decision not to apply the regulation
prospectively did not constitute an abuse of discretion.
As noted in Anderson, Clayton, there are a number of
"factors" that shape the consideration of this issue.
In
Klamath, the court examined each of the "factors" articulated
by the Fifth Circuit in a structured fashion. The other courts
that have passed on Treas. Reg. §I. 752-6 did so by applying a
more flexible approach. Regardless of the mechanics applied
to the analysis, it is clear that the principal concerns were - (a)
whether prior law was settled, (b) the extent that the regulation
altered prior law, (c) the taxpayers' justifiable reliance on that
prior law, and (d) whether giving the regulation retroactive
effect would produce an inordinately harsh result.

Klamath, Sa/a and Stobie Creek held that Helmer72 and
its progen/3 represented a well established body of law which
called for contingent liabilities to be excluded from the
calculation of basis under section 752. In seeking to establish
that the law was not settled, the court in Maguire Partners
74
noted that the Secretary relied on Rev. Rul. 88-77, Rev. Rul.
75
95-26 and Salina Partnership v. Commissioner76 in issuing
77
Treas. Reg.§ 1.752-6.
In Kornman v. Commissioner, 78 the Fifth Circuit
adopted the reasoning of Rev. Rut 95-26 in concluding that an
obligation to replace borrowed securities and to close a short
sale gave rise to a liability. In so doing, the court rejected the
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taxpayer's reliance on Helmer. The Kornman court also found
that "[t]he initial short sale that generates the cash proceeds and
the subsequent covering transaction are inextricably
intertwined."79 Citing Kornman, the court in Maguire Partners
held that applying "the Helmer line of cases to this case would
... ' [f]ly in the face of reality' and result in an 'unwarranted
aberration'"80 While the Secretary did not follow Helmer line
of cases in promulgating Treas. Reg. § 1.752-6, even assuming
that these cases constituted settled law it is questionable that
there was a major alteration to that prior law given the
fundamental factual differences between Helmer and cases
such as Klamath, Sa/a and Stobie Creek, Cemco and Maguire
Partners.
The question of alteration really comes down to
whether the taxpayers/partnerships at issue in the Treas. Reg.
§1.752-6 cases justifiably relied on the Helmer line of cases
and whether the "change" effectuated by the regulation caused
them to suffer an inordinately harsh result. A logical way to
pose the first question is - Is a taxpayer justified in relying on a
case that excluded from basis consideration an option granted
to purchase property owned by a partnership, when the actual
transaction they engaged in was the contribution to a
partnership of a long option and a short option (the proceeds
from which were used to acquire the long position) and the
failure to treat the short option as a liability resulted in a
multimillion dollar inflation of the basis of the long option
position? With respect to the second point, the question is Does the denial of the claimed tax benefits that flow from such
a transaction, constitute an inordinately harsh result? If the
answer to both questions is yes, the Secretary was not justified
in making the regulation retroactive. If the answer to either is
no, the regulation should properly be given retroactive effect.
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As the CRTRA is not considered as authority for the
issuance of Treas. Reg. § 1.752-6, the only remaining question
is - How far back can the Secretary go in making the
regulation retroactive? Conceivably, there would be no limit
on its retroactivity assuming that the law was not "settled." If
the law is considered settled, than the question is - At what
point would someone engaging in an " inflated basis"
transaction be considered as having notice of the "change?"
The question could be posed alternatively as - Was the
Secretary's selection of October 18, 1999 as the limitation on
retroactive effect supportable? An argument could clearly be
made that given the nature of the transactions (i. e., the creation
of losses by inflating basis) that anyone considering entry into
this type of transaction should have had pause for concern in
light of the Congressional disapproval of "basis inflation" as
embodied in section 358(h) and the directive in CRTRA
§309(c) that "comparable" regulations be issued in the
81
Subchapter K arena.
Failing that, the question is, should retroactivity be
permitted back to August 14, 2000, the date the Service issued
Notice 2000-44. Arguably, Notice 2000-44 does not satisfy
the requirements of section 7805(b )( 1)(C) which permits
retroactive application of a regulation to the date when the
Secretary issues " any notice substantially describing the
expected contents of any temporary, proposed, or final
regulation." Query, whether this section is even applicable
since the efficacy of Notice 2000-44 must be measured under
the abuse of discretion standard attendant in Old Section
7805(b). There can be little question that Notice 2000-44 was
intended to put taxpayers on notice that "inflated basis"
transactions would not be respected. Since the question under
Old Section 7805(b) was one of justifiable reliance, the issue
would be whether a taxpayer would be justified in relying on
the Helmer line of cases, when the Service has indicated that
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"questionable transactions" such as those described in Notice
2000-44 would not be respected.
IV. CONCLUSION
It would appear that the Service has the better of the
arguments regarding the validity of Treas. Reg. § 1.752-6.
Under Chevron, because of the explicit direction to fill a gap in
the statute and because section 309(c) of the CRTRA appears
to be ambiguous, the regulation is a "permissible construction"
of that provision. By virtue of section 309(d) its retroactivity
to October 18, 1999 is justified pursuant to section 7805(b)( 6).
Alternatively, under either Chevron or National Muffler, the
Service again has the better argument that it is a valid
interpretive regulation. Finally, the Service has the better
argument under Old Section 7805(b), that the regulation
should be retroactive in effect.
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In Klamath, the district court held the regulation to be interpretive in
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entered into prior to August II , 2000 the date Notice 2000-44 was issued.
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respect to transactions entered into after A ugust 14, 2000 as no such
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regulation, but rather, once again, was an interpretative one. The Sa/a,
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found the regulation to be "contrary to the underlying statutes." 552 F.
Supp. 2d at 1203. The Court of Federal Claims in Stobie Creek similarly
denied legislative regulation status to Treas. Reg. § 1.752-6, holding it
invalid because the general abuse provision of section 7805(b)(3) was
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taxpayers of the change in position from established legal principles.
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The C RTRA was introduced in the House on December 14, 2000 as H.R.
5662, which was then incorporated by reference into H.R. 4577. H.R. 4577
passed the House and the Senate on December 15, 2000. The conference
report on H.R. 4577 (H.R. Conf. Rept. No. 106-1033) was filed in the
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The Sa/a court declared the regulation not to be "comparable" because it
failed to take into account the fact that the related long option position was
also contributed to the partnership. 552 F.3d at 1199-1200
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The relevance of section 358(h)(2) is questionable in determining whether
the regulations ostensibly issued under CRTRA §309(c) are "comparable."
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The court's importation of the section 358(h)(2) exceptions without
giving effect to this limiting language denied the Secretary a right
specifically granted to him by Congress.
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partnership's basis in the stock received was determi ned under section 358.
This was unchanged by section 309(a). Section 358(h) would cause the
basis of the stock a transferor partnership received to be reduced to its fair
market value, in the same manner as it would an individual transferor's
stock basis. Thus, a sale by the transferor partnership of the stock would
not result in the acceleration or duplication of any loss. Similarly, if the
partnership were to distribute the stock to a partner in a non-liquidating
distribution, there would be little, if any, potential for the acceleration or
duplication of any loss as the distributee partner would take as his basis in
the stock the lesser of his basis in the partnership or the partnership's basis
in the stock. See, Section 732(a). The only situation that presents a
meaningful possibility for either the acceleration or duplication of a loss is
where the partnership itself is liquidated (or the interest of a specific partner
is liquidated) and the stock received by the partnership is distributed to the
partners or a partner. In that case, the distributee partner w ill take as his
basis in the stock, his basis in his partnership interest. See, Rev. Rul. 84111 , 1984-2 C.B. 88 (Situation I). Prior to the issuance ofTreas. Reg.
§ 1.358-7(b), the partner' s basis in his interest would not have been reduced
by a contingent liability. Thus, a partner would have effectively "steppedup" his basis in the stock received by the partnership and di stributed to him
in liquidation of his interest in the partnership. This "step-up" would have
created the possibility of an acceleration or duplication of a loss by inflating
the basis of the stock he received.

60

The legislative history of CRTRA §309 is clear that section 358(h)
" does not change the tax treatment with respect to the transferee
corporation." Thus, a corporation continues to utilize its shareholder's basis
in the asset, without reduction for any liability, fixed or contingent.
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The loss "duplication" that section 358(h) addresses is the result of the
"double-tax" regimen of Subchapter C. Anytime a transfer takes place
pursuant to section 351, gain, income or loss is potentially duplicated
because of the separate taxable entity status of a corporation. Subchapter K,
on the other hand, is concerned with flow-through entities (i.e., those that
arc not taxpaying entities). The possibility of loss duplication does exist in
the context of a partner or partnership that acquires stock in a transaction
within the scope of section 351, albeit on a smaller scale. See, Section
111(8)(4), infra.

For example, the Secretary could have addressed this potential for abuse
through the exercise of his general authority under section 7805(a) and
made any regulation retroactive pursuant to his authority under section
7805(b)(3).

The court had earlier addressed the meaning of the phrase "acceleration
or duplication of losses." See, Section !11(8)(3), supra. In addition, it also
had earlier addressed the absence of a specific reference to section 752.
See, Section Ill(8)( I), supra.
65

See, H.R. Con f. Rept. No. I 06-1033 which refers to "the assumption of
liabilities (as defined in the provision) in transactions involving
partnerships." (Emphasis added)
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62

Prior to the enactment ofCRTRA §309(a), the transfer by a partnership
of its assets and liabilities was governed by section 351, and the transferor

This action is generally consiste nt with the Congressional action in
attempting to curb efforts to create non-economic losses which would then
be deducted for tax purposes by inflating basis. As noted, by the court in
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Cemco, the regulation "instantiate[s] the pre-existing norm that transactions
with no economic substance don't reduce people's taxes." 515 F.3d at 752
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467 U.S. at 844
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We are aware that the court in Sa/a respected the underlying transactions
and sanctioned the created loss in that case. We believe that the Sa/a court
made numerous errors in reaching the result that it did and that Sa/a will be
reversed on appeal. A discussion of the District court's opinion is beyond
the scope of this article.
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See, Section 7805(b)(6)
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440 U.S. at 477
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The Secretary's decision to make the regulation retroactive to October 18,
1999 makes sense given his overall reliance on CRTRA §309(c).
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T.C. Memo 1975-160. The transaction at issue in Helmer was the status
of option payments held to have been received by the partnership and then
distributed to the partners. The option payments were not refundable by the
partnership and the partnership's only obligation was to apply them against
the sales price of property owned by the partnership which was the subject
of the option. The Internal Revenue Service argued that any liability under
the option was "contingent" and could not be used to increase the partner's
basis. As a result the partners were required to report a gain under section
731. The property in Helmer was already owned by the partnership when
the option was granted. Thus, the option and the property were not
contributed to the partnership in the same transaction.
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Long v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. I ( 1978), aff'd and remanded, 660 F.2d
416 (1 Ot11 Cir. 1981); LaRue v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 465 ( 1988); see, also,
Gibson Products Co. v. United States, 637 F.2d 1041 (5th Cir. 1981).
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1995- 1 C.B. 13 1
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T.C. Memo 2000-352
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The Seventh Circuit in Cemco made short shrift of the plaintiffs efforts
to rely on Helmer, stating "Cemco says that in treating $50,000 of euros as
having a $3.6 million basis which turned in to a loss ... it was just relying on
Helmer .... That may or may not be the right way to understand Helmer; we
need not decide, for it is not controlling in this court - or anywhere else."
515 F.3dat751
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527 F.3d 443 (5th Cir. 2008). Kornman involved similar option spread
transactions. While the court acknowledged the Service's reliance on Treas.
Reg. § 1.752-6, it declined to address its validity noting that it had found that
the short sale created a liability based upon its reading of section 752 and
Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1 (a)(4)(i). 527 F.3d at 462
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527 F.3d at 460-61. See, also, Maguire Partners, I 03 AFTR 2d at 773775 (applying the step-transaction doctrine to establish that the long option,
short option and the AIG note were interlocking obligations that created the
"bet" the taxpayer claimed he was attempting to take advantage of); Jade
Trading v. United States, 80 Fed. Cl. 11 (2007), reh. denied, 81 Fed. Cl.
173 (2007), appeal docket (Fed Cir. 2/26/2008)
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I 03 AFTR 2d at 776

Cf, CWT Farms, quoting, Wendland v. Commissioner, 739 F.2d 580
(II th Cir. 1972) and citing Helvering v. Reynolds and Chock Full 0' Nuts
(proposed regulations should have put taxpayer on notice where he engaged
in "questionable transactions") 755 F.2d at 804

